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CHAPTER 8
Preferential trade agreements and global 
value chains: Theory, evidence, and open questions
MICHELE RUTA
Two phenomena have characterized the trade and trade policy landscape since the early 1990s. The rise of global value chains (GVCs) — the denationaliza-tion of production — has changed international trade, 
with trade in parts and components increasing almost six times 
between 1990 and 2015, faster than the 4.5 times for other forms 
of trade. On the policy side, preferential trade agreements are 
increasing in number and deepening in content.1 Their number 
surged from 50 in 1990 to close to 280 in 2015. These agree-
ments are also deepening, in the sense that they cover an 
expanding set of policy areas, such as investment and competi-
tion policy, that go well beyond the traditional focus of preferen-
tial trade agreements, such as tariffs.
This chapter analyzes the relationship between preferential 
trade agreements, particularly “deep” preferential trade agree-
ments, and GVCs. The goal is to answer six policy- relevant 
questions:
• How have preferential trade agreements evolved?
• In a world with GVCs, why do countries sign preferential trade 
agreements?
• Do preferential trade agreements increase GVC integration?
• How does the content of preferential trade agreements affect 
GVC trade?
• How do GVCs affect the choice of preferential trade agree-
ment partners?
• What is the outlook of the relationship between preferential 
trade agreements and GVCs going forward?
This chapter contributes to the large literature on preferen-
tial trade agreements (such as Limao 2016) in several ways. First, 
based on new World Bank data, it documents how preferential 
trade agreements have deepened over time and how this evo-
lution is associated with the rise of GVCs. Second, it reviews the 
theoretical literature on the rationale for the relationship between 
preferential trade agreements and GVCs and outlines avenues for 
future research. Third, it discusses empirical research suggest-
ing that deep agreements boost GVC integration and showing 
how this impact differs across country groups. Finally, it presents 
a simple framework for thinking about the relationship between 
preferential trade agreements and GVCs going forward.
While more work is needed, several findings emerge from this 
review. New data on the content of trade agreements and on 
participation in GVCs point to a strong positive correlation, with 
deeper agreements associated with more intense GVC relation-
ships. Economic theory identifies several explanations for this 
relationship, ranging from the need to internalize cross-border 
policy spillovers to the benefits of stronger commitments in poli-
cies that affect GVC participation. Econometric analysis confirms 
that deep preferential trade agreements boost participation in 
GVCs, suggesting that trade agreements can be an effective 
tool for policymakers to anchor national producers to global and 
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regional production processes. Going forward, the future of the 
relationship between preferential trade agreements and GVCs 
will depend on continuing trust in the willingness of other part-
ners to preserve an open trading system.
Evolution of preferential trade agreements
New evidence on the evolution of preferential trade agree-
ments offers a basis for discussing the relationship between 
trade agreements and GVCs. The number of preferential trade 
agreements has increased dramatically in the last quarter cen-
tury, from 50 trade agreements in force and notified to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1990 to 279 at the end of 2015.2 
This dramatic change has spurred debate among researchers3 
and policymakers on the rationale for preferential arrange-
ments; their impact on the trade flows, growth, and welfare of 
member and nonmember countries; and their relationship with 
the broader system of global trade governance.
Often overlooked in the literature on trade agreements is that 
their content — as well as their number — has changed over time. 
Before the 1990s, trade arrangements involved mostly tariff reduc-
tions, but more recent preferential trade agreements include other 
policy provisions as well. Two recent studies document how several 
trade agreements cover regulatory areas such as services, invest-
ment, competition policy, intellectual property rights protection, 
and others (Horn, Mavroidis, and Sapir 2010; WTO 2011). Building 
on the methodology in these studies, Hofmann, Osnago, and Ruta 
(2017) collected information on all preferential trade agreements in 
force and notified to the WTO in 2015. Their new database contains 
information on the inclusion and legal enforceability of 52 policy 
areas in 279 preferential trade agreements among 189 countries.4
The database documents the changing content of preferential 
trade agreements. A growing number of trade agreements cover 
more than 20 policy areas, a majority of newly signed preferential 
trade agreements cover 10–20 policy areas, and a minority focus 
on fewer than 10 policy areas (figure 8.1).
The new database also allows looking in detail at the content 
of trade agreements. In addition to tariff reductions, more than 
half the preferential trade agreements in the database include 
legally enforceable regulations on some policy areas that fall 
under the current mandate of the WTO (figure 8.2). These pro-
visions, referred to as “WTO-plus” or “WTO+” in the literature, 
include customs regulations, export taxes, antidumping mea-
sures, countervailing duty measures, technical barriers to trade, 
and sanitary and phytosanitary standards. Provisions outside the 
WTO mandate (usually called “WTO-extra” or “WTO-X”) include 
a wide-ranging set of policy areas, from investment to environ-
mental laws and nuclear safety. The inclusion of these provisions 
in preferential trade agreements and their legal enforceability 
varies widely by policy area (figure 8.3).
Preferential trade agreement provisions can also be disag-
gregated in different ways depending on the question under 
investigation. Following Hofmann, Onsnago, and Ruta (2017), 
preferential trade agreement provisions are divided here into 
core and noncore. Core provisions are identified in the literature 
as economically more meaningful (Baldwin 2008; Damuri 2012) 
and include the set of WTO-plus provisions and four WTO-extra 
provisions (competition policy, investment, movement of capi-
tal, and intellectual property rights protection) that appear fre-
quently in preferential trade agreements. Almost 90% of agree-
ments include at least one of the core WTO-extra provisions, 
and one third of preferential trade agreements include all core 
WTO-extra provisions (see figures 8.2 and 8.3).
FIGURE 8.1 The number and content of preferential trade agreements, 1951–2015
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Source: World Bank Content of Deep Trade Agreements Database (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/deep-trade-agreements).
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FIGURE 8.2 “WTO-plus” policy areas in preferential trade agreements, 2015
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FIGURE 8.3 “WTO-extra” policy areas in preferential trade agreements, 2015
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The new data also reveal the changing depth of preferen-
tial trade agreements. Hofmann, Osnago, and Ruta (2017) con-
structed synthetic indexes of depth, which measure the cover-
age of policy areas in preferential trade agreements. The first 
index of depth, referred to as “total depth,” is the simple count 
of (legally enforceable) provisions in a preferential trade agree-
ment. Total depth increased from an average of around 8 provi-
sions in the 1990s to more than 17 in 2010–15. An index of “core 
depth” can be constructed by counting how many core provi-
sions are included and legally enforceable in a preferential trade 
agreement. Core depth increased from around 7 provisions in 
the 1990s to almost 14 in 2010–15. Principal component analy-
sis can produce a third index of depth that accounts for most 
of the variability in the data. Principal component analysis depth 
increased from around 1 in the 1990s to 2.8 in 2010–15.
The wide country coverage of the new data allows for analy-
sis of the heterogeneity of deep preferential trade agreements 
across regions and incomes. Europe has the highest number of 
signed preferential trade agreements, and these preferential 
trade agreements are the deepest mainly because of the Euro-
pean Community Treaty and the subsequent EU enlargements. 
The average total depth of EU agreements is 25 provisions. Deep 
preferential trade agreements are also common for members of 
the European Free Trade Association (average of 23 policy pro-
visions), Japan (21), and the Republic of Korea (20). Preferential 
trade agreements signed between developed and developing 
countries (North–South preferential trade agreements) include 
on average almost as many provisions (20) as North–North pref-
erential trade agreements (22). But legal enforceability is gener-
ally weaker in North–South preferential trade agreements than in 
North–North agreements. And South–South preferential trade 
agreements, with an average total depth of 13 provisions, tend 
to be shallower than other preferential trade agreements.
Global value chains and the rationale for trade 
agreements
What is the rationale for trade agreements, particularly deep 
agreements, in a world with GVCs? An extensive literature has 
examined the motives for trade policy cooperation and the design 
of trade agreements in a traditional setting, where production is 
entirely national and not fragmented internationally.5 The focus 
generally is on cooperation on tariffs, consistent with the idea that 
the main problem that trade agreements solve is to internalize the 
terms-of-trade externality created by unilateral tariffs. But there is 
a positive correlation between GVC trade (measured as trade in 
parts and components) and the depth of trade agreements (mea-
sured by the number of policy areas covered by the agreements; 
figure 8.4). This relationship indicates that the rationale for trade 
agreements may be more complex in the context of GVCs than in 
settings where production is not fragmented internationally.
Lawrence (1996) first introduced the notion of “shallow” and 
“deep” trade agreements. Shallow agreements focus on tariffs 
and other border measures that directly affect market access. 
Economic theory and evidence suggest a relationship between 
cross-border production and shallow preferential trade agree-
ments. For instance, Blanchard and Matschke (2015) estimated 
that a 10% increase in U.S. foreign affiliate exports to the United 
States is associated with a 4 percentage point increase in the rate 
of preferential duty-free access. Intuitively, firms that offshore 
production are more likely to lobby for lower tariffs on products 
re-imported into the U.S. market. Similarly, domestic firms may 
choose to locate production stages in another preferential trade 
agreement member under the expectation that tariffs on re- 
imported goods will be lower.
Deep agreements go beyond traditional market access issues 
and include disciplines such as investment, competition policy, 
and harmonization of product regulations. The new empirical 
evidence on the relationship between preferential trade agree-
ment depth and GVC trade is the core of the next sections. Here, 
this relationship is discussed from a theoretical point of view 
(Antràs and Staiger 2012; Baldwin 2008; WTO 2011; Ederington 
and Ruta 2016).
A simple way to explain the correlation between GVC trade 
and depth of preferential trade agreements is that certain 
behind-the-border policies need to be disciplined in trade 
agreements for GVCs to operate efficiently. First, the unbun-
dling of stages of production across borders creates new forms 
of cross-border policy spillovers beyond the traditional terms-
of-trade externality. Second, governments may face credibility 
FIGURE 8.4 Relationship between depth of preferential 
trade agreements and global value chain trade
Density
–10 0 10 20
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
0.125
No preferential
trade agreeement
Low depth
Medium depth
High depth
Imports of parts and components (log)
Source: Hoffman, Osnago, and Ruta 2017.
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problems for behind-the-border measures in the context of 
GVCs. And third, the costs created by coordination externalities 
(such as heterogeneous regulations) may be higher in the pres-
ence of cross-border production. These spillovers and credibility 
concerns generate demand for deeper forms of integration.
Despite the rich set of arguments in the literature, many 
aspects of the relationship between deep preferential trade 
agreements and GVCs have not been incorporated in formal 
models. Foremost is the fundamental question of the role that 
deep agreements play in the presence of GVCs. For instance, 
Antràs and Staiger (2012) show that behind-the-border policies 
create cross-border spillovers when production is internationally 
fragmented. While they indicate that deep provisions in prefer-
ential trade agreements may allow governments to internalize 
these externalities, their model does not provide a formal treat-
ment of this point. Similarly, the commitment rationale for deep 
agreements has been formalized only for specific provisions 
(such as domestic subsidies in Brou and Ruta 2013), and this has 
not been done in a GVC context. Finally, studies of the harmo-
nization of standards and other forms of regulatory cooperation 
(such as Costinot 2008) generally rely on traditional trade models 
that assume that production is purely domestic.
Several other interesting questions are also still open. One 
set of questions relates to the content of deep agreements. A 
large trade literature has recently investigated the role of insti-
tutions in shaping the international organization of production 
(Antràs 2015). Osnago, Rocha, and Ruta (2015) find evidence that 
the content of deep preferential trade agreements affects deci-
sions on foreign direct investment, suggesting that the role of 
specific provisions in shaping GVCs may be relevant. But more 
work is needed to understand the specific channels. A second 
area relates to the role of preferential as opposed to multilateral 
deep integration. Why is deep integration generally taking place 
in preferential trade agreements? How are preferential trade 
agreement partners selected in a GVC context? (These ques-
tions are returned to below.)
Do deep agreements promote global value 
chains?
The relationship between GVCs and preferential trade agree-
ments runs in both directions.6 An important policy question 
concerns how much trade agreements, particularly deep pref-
erential trade agreements, can boost GVC integration. Osnago, 
Rocha, and Ruta (2016) used a gravity model to exploit the new 
World Bank data on the content of preferential trade agree-
ments, using the three measures of the “depth” of preferential 
trade agreements discussed earlier (total depth, core depth, and 
principal component analysis depth). Bilateral GVC integration is 
measured in two ways: trade in parts and components and trade 
in value added. Data on trade in parts and components have the 
advantage of being available for a larger set of countries and 
years covered by the new dataset on preferential trade agree-
ments. Trade in value added is a more precise measure of GVC 
involvement, but data are limited to a small sample of countries 
(41) and time coverage is limited to 1995–2011.7
The empirical approach is based on the standard augmented 
gravity model, which has been widely used to assess the impact 
of preferential trade agreements on trade flows (see Baier and 
Bergstrand 2007). Unlike in the standard approach, which uses 
a dummy variable to identify the presence of a trade agreement 
between a country pair, Osnago, Rocha, and Ruta (2016) used the 
three measures of the “depth” of preferential trade agreements 
discussed earlier (total depth, core depth, and principal compo-
nent analysis depth). Their regressions of the impact of preferen-
tial trade agreement depth on GVC trade included a set of fixed 
effects and control for various determinants of bilateral trade. 
Signing deep agreements has a large and positive impact on 
GVC trade (figure 8.5). Adding a provision to a preferential trade 
agreement increases bilateral trade in parts and components 
1.5% and re-exported value added 0.4%. This means that signing 
the deepest preferential trade agreement in the sample doubles 
trade in parts and components and increases re- exported value 
added about 22%.
The analysis of the impact of preferential trade agreements 
on GVC trade presents two difficult econometric challenges. 
FIGURE 8.5 The impact of deep preferential trade 
agreements on two types of global value chain trade
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Note: Total depth is the simple count of (legally enforceable) provisions in a 
preferential trade agreement. Core depth is a count of how many core provi-
sions are included and legally enforceable in a preferential trade agreement. 
Principal component analysis depth is an index that accounts for most of the 
variability in the data.
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The first is that, as first noted in Johnson and Noguera (2014) 
and Noguera (2012), value-added trade depends not only on 
bilateral trade costs, but also on trade costs with third coun-
tries. The second challenge is the endogeneity of GVC trade and 
preferential trade agreements. Osnago, Rocha, and Ruta (2016) 
attempted to address both problems.
First, to take into consideration the indirect effects that pref-
erential trade agreements by third countries may have on GVC 
trade of other countries, the depth variable of interest needs to 
be weighted to take into account the international input-output 
structure. Following the methodology proposed by Noguera 
(2012), Osnago, Rocha, and Ruta (2016) found that accounting for 
the depth of third-country agreements increases the impact of 
preferential trade agreements on GVCs.
The second empirical concern is endogeneity. Deep preferen-
tial trade agreements may stimulate the creation of GVCs by pro-
viding common disciplines that allow internalizing cross-border 
policy spillovers and address credibility problems. But countries 
already involved in GVCs may be more likely to sign deep pref-
erential trade agreements because cross-border production cre-
ates a demand for deep provisions. The fixed-effect approach 
partially controls for this reverse causality since it compares 
country pairs before and after a preferential trade agreement is 
signed. But other time-varying country pair characteristics may 
not be controlled for. Osnago, Rocha, and Ruta (2016) adopted 
an instrumental variable approach to address this type of endog-
eneity, using as an instrument for the depth of the preferential 
trade agreement between country i and country j the (weighted) 
average depth of all the agreements signed by countries i and j 
with any other country, excluding the agreements they have in 
common. Results of the analysis confirm the relevance of deep 
agreements in boosting GVC trade.
An alternative approach for determining the importance of 
deep preferential trade agreements for GVCs is to look at the 
effect of depth on different sectors. The effect of deep prefer-
ential trade agreements should be stronger in sectors that are 
more integrated in GVCs. To test this, Osnago, Rocha, and Ruta 
(2016) exploited the decomposition of gross exports into value-
added components available for 13 manufacturing sectors in the 
World Input-Output Database for 1995–2011. They augmented a 
sector-level gravity regression with an interaction term between 
depth and an index of vertical specialization. The coefficient of 
the interaction term is consistently positive and significant across 
specifications and using different variables of depth and provi-
sions. The results suggest that deep preferential trade agree-
ments have a larger impact on GVC-intensive sectors.8
Global value chains and the content of 
preferential trade agreements
This section digs further into the relationship between deep 
preferential trade agreements and GVCs and explores empiri-
cally potential heterogeneity in the effects of deep preferential 
trade agreements.9 Following Osnago, Rocha, and Ruta (2016), 
it considers two dimensions of heterogeneity: splitting the pro-
visions into different categories (WTO-plus and WTO-extra) and 
dividing preferential trade agreements by the level of develop-
ment of country pairs (North–North, North–South, and South–
South). These extensions allow for investigation of the types of 
provisions that drive the relationship between deep agreements 
and GVCs among different sets of countries.
Countries can have different reasons for signing trade agree-
ments, depending on, among other things, the level of liberaliza-
tion already achieved. World Bank data show that North–North 
preferential trade agreements and North–South preferential 
trade agreements tend to have similar depth (number of provi-
sions covered by the agreement) and South–South preferential 
trade agreements are on average shallower. In addition, the prev-
alence of WTO-plus and WTO-extra provisions varies according 
to the level of development of the signatories of the agreement. 
North–North and North–South preferential trade agreements 
tend to have more WTO-extra provisions, though for North–
South agreements they are less likely to be legally enforceable 
(figure 8.6). South–South agreements tend to focus on WTO-plus 
issues, which are the more traditional trade policy areas.
There is no formal theory to guide the analysis of differential 
effects of deep preferential trade agreements across countries’ 
level of development, but a plausible argument is that deep pref-
erential trade agreements matter for developed and developing 
economies for different reasons. With trade among developed 
countries already largely liberalized and domestic institutions 
robust, North–North deep agreements aim mostly to internal-
ize cross-border policy spillovers. Deep agreements have addi-
tional roles for developing countries, since trade generally faces 
higher barriers and domestic institutions are weaker relative to 
advanced economies. North–South deep trade agreements offer 
an anchor to boost GVC participation of developing countries by 
providing a commitment device for border and behind-the-bor-
der policies. Since tariffs between developing countries are often 
still high, South–South preferential trade agreements affect GVC 
participation mostly through traditional trade liberalization.
To investigate the effect of the content of preferential trade 
agreements depending on countries’ level of development, 
Osnago, Rocha, and Ruta (2016) ran three regressions on differ-
ent groups of countries: North–North, North–South, and South–
South. To allow for a broader sample of countries, data on trade 
in parts and components are used in these regressions to mea-
sure the extent of GVC integration among country pairs. In each 
regression, the key explanatory variable is the number of WTO-
plus and WTO-extra provisions in a preferential trade agreement 
rather than preferential trade agreement depth.
The content of preferential trade agreements matters for GVC 
integration, and the impact varies by countries’ level of devel-
opment. WTO-plus provisions, such as tariff reduction, drive the 
effect of deep preferential trade agreements on South–South 
trade in parts and components. Each additional WTO-plus pro-
vision boosts South–South GVC integration 8.3%. WTO-extra 
provisions, such as investment and competition policy, drive 
the effects of North–South trade in parts and components. An 
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additional WTO-extra provision in a North–South preferential 
trade agreement increases GVC integration 4.3%.
Global value chains and the choice of 
preferential trade agreement partners
From a normative perspective the issue is whether the interna-
tional fragmentation of production changes the merits of region-
alism relative to multilateralism. From a positive perspective the 
question is whether the presence of GVCs (or the possibility of 
anchoring a country to them) changes the way countries select 
their trading partners. This section briefly looks at both issues 
from a theoretical perspective and then applies the question to 
China.
The debate on the merits of regionalism versus multilateral ism 
dates back at least to Viner (1950). In traditional models, where 
production is entirely national and tariffs are the sole instrument 
of trade policy, preferential trade agreements are suboptimal to 
a multilateral agreement from a global welfare perspective. How-
ever, preferential arrangements may still be efficient from the 
perspective of an individual country, for both economic and non-
economic reasons. First, countries may benefit from a preferential 
trade agreement at the expense of other countries not included 
in the agreement. This would be the case where exports from 
members displace exports from nonmembers. Second, coun-
tries may have noneconomic reasons to sign trade agreements, 
because preferential trade agreements can strengthen security 
ties or work as a building block for political integration. As these 
arguments are beggar-thy-neighbor or noneconomic, preferen-
tial trade agreements are an inefficient substitute for multilateral 
trade liberalization from an economic point of view.
GVCs alter this logic by creating new rationales for preferen-
tial trade agreements: the unbundling of stages of production 
across borders creates new forms of international policy spill-
overs and time-consistency problems. These in turn generate 
demand for deeper forms of integration. For deep agreements 
involving behind- the- border policies, a tradeoff arises between 
economies of scale and heterogeneity of preferences.10 This 
tradeoff is well known in the public economics literature that 
deals with fiscal federalism (Oates 1999). While noneconomic 
arguments and new beggar- thy- neighbor gains (such as a “rule 
of law” externality) may still drive the decisions to form prefer-
ential trade agreements, smaller groups can be efficient from 
an economic point of view as they efficiently trade off the costs 
and benefits of deep integration. As argued in WTO (2011), deep 
FIGURE 8.6 The depth of preferential trade agreements by the type or provisions and the development level of members
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Note: WTO-plus provisions include legally enforceable regulations on policy areas that are under the current mandate of World Trade Organization (WTO) cus-
toms regulations, such as export taxes, antidumping measures, and technical barriers to trade. WTO-extra provisions are outside the WTO mandate and include 
a wide-ranging set of policy areas, from investment to environmental laws and nuclear safety.
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preferential trade agreements may complement rather than sub-
stitute for the multilateral trading system because they allow for 
coordinating or harmonizing policies that could not be coordi-
nated or harmonized at the global level.
From a positive perspective the literature on shallow prefer-
ential trade agreements struggled with the notion of the ideal 
trade partner (Schiff and Winters 2003). Two main sets of eco-
nomic characteristics increase the benefits of forming a prefer-
ential trade agreement with a specific partner. The first is trade 
intensity, which suggests that the two countries are “natural” 
trade partners. Characteristics such as geographic proximity 
that increase trade intensity among partners make it more con-
venient to reduce bilateral tariffs. The second has to do with 
comparative advantage: complementarities in production or 
consumption increase the benefit of forming a preferential trade 
agreement.
Are these characteristics relevant in the context of GVCs? 
The answer is not obvious, and the literature is not yet devel-
oped. Some characteristics still matter. For instance, proximity 
may be important in selecting preferential trade agreement 
partners because face-to-face communication is relevant to 
managing supply chains. Similarly, comparative advantage 
can be defined at the task level, with complementarities — say, 
between different stages of production — guiding the choice of 
preferential trade agreement partners. But other characteristics 
would appear to matter too, such as cross-country differences 
in policy preferences. If GVCs require deep agreements to 
function smoothly, ideal preferential trade agreement partners 
should not have policy preferences that are too different, since 
this would increase the cost of coordinating and harmonizing 
policies.
There is a new focus in the literature on the experience of 
China in choosing preferential trade agreement partners. To 
characterize preferential trade agreements from the point of 
view of GVCs, Cheng and others (2016) borrowed the “smile 
curve.” The horizontal axis represents a continuum of tasks or 
stages of GVC from upstream to downstream covering research 
and development, intermediates, assembly, processing, market-
ing, and after-sale services. The vertical axis depicts the value 
added generated from various tasks or stages. Based on this 
notion, Cheng and others (2016) defined vertical preferential 
trade agreements as agreements driven by comparative advan-
tage at the task level — agreements formed as a result of the ver-
tical division of labor along the supply chain, with member econ-
omies locating at different GVC positions.
With this framework in mind, Cheng and others (2016) asked 
whether China’s preferential trade agreements exploit com-
plementarities in production along the supply chain. China has 
concluded and is implementing 13 preferential trade agree-
ments involving 21 individual economies11 and is negotiating or 
has proposed 11 other bilateral and regional preferential trade 
agreements, along with the 16-member Regional Comprehen-
sive Economic Partnership. By quantifying China’s GVC link-
age with its preferential trade agreement and non–preferential 
trade agreement partners, Cheng and others found that GVC 
complementarities are important in the choice of preferential 
trade agreement partners for China.
The future of the relationship between deep 
agreements and global value chains
The past 25 years have been a period of deepening trade agree-
ments and growing intensity of GVCs. Will this trend continue 
in the next quarter century? Given the growing backlash to glo-
balization in advanced economies, this is no longer a rhetorical 
question. There are reasons for optimism, as GVCs and prefer-
ential trade agreements reinforce each other and make slipping 
backward less likely. But the future of this relationship should not 
be taken for granted because cross-border production decisions 
depend on expectations concerning trading partners’ future 
trade policies. Negative expectations could result in a rever-
sal of the current trends toward GVC expansion and deeper 
integration.
Some observers have argued that the current globalization 
backlash has similarities to the backlash of the early 20th century 
and that this may lead to a prisoner’s dilemma, where countries 
escalate protectionism even though it is not in their interest, as 
in the 1930s. This pessimistic view of the future of trade relations 
does not acknowledge that the production structure and trade 
policy landscape of today are very different from those of the 
early 20th century.
Trade agreements have stimulated the creation of GVCs by 
internalizing cross-border policy externalities, lowering trade 
costs, and providing deeper common disciplines that facilitate 
the operation of economic activities spanning multiple borders. 
In turn, GVCs have changed the political economy of trade policy, 
discouraging protectionism and creating a demand for deep inte-
gration. The higher the domestic content of foreign-produced 
final goods, the lower the tariffs set by governments (Blanchard, 
Bown, and Johnson 2016) and the higher the GVC trade with 
partners, the deeper the agreements countries sign (Orefice and 
Rocha 2014). This two-way relationship between GVCs and pref-
erential trade agreements supports the view that trade disinte-
gration (protectionism, undoing trade agreements) is unlikely.
Despite these dramatic changes, however, the future of the 
relationship between preferential trade agreements and GVCs 
should not be taken for granted. GVCs are the result of firms’ 
investment and sourcing decisions, which are endogenous 
because they depend on expectations of future trade policies. 
If firms expect a change in future trade policy, they will take this 
into account in their decisions, possibly leading them to rena-
tionalize (part of) their production processes. In this context, 
expectations can lead to multiple equilibria and give rise to coor-
dination failures. More than the well-known prisoner’s dilemma, 
the current situation may be described as a trust dilemma (or a 
coordination game) where what is rational to choose depends on 
beliefs about what others will do.
A simple game illustrates the trust dilemma that may charac-
terize the relationship between preferential trade agreements 
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and GVCs — referred to here as the trust dilemma of deep inte-
gration (table 8.1). Consider two players, Home and Foreign, 
and assume that each has two strategies. They can opt for deep 
agreements and GVCs or choose national production and no 
trade agreement. Each player chooses an action without knowing 
the choice of the other. If a player chooses to maintain an inter-
national production process and a deep agreement, it needs the 
cooperation of the partner to succeed. Choosing national pro-
duction and no trade agreement, by contrast, requires no coop-
eration with the other player but also leads to lower welfare.
The trust dilemma of deep integration has two pure- strategy 
Nash equilibria. The first is the upper-left corner of table 8.1, 
where Home and Foreign cooperate (2,2); the second is the 
lower-right corner, where the two players defect and choose 
not to cooperate (1,1). With global welfare inferior in the no-
cooperation strategy, this equilibrium can be described as a 
coordination failure. Importantly, this equilibrium can be the 
result of a self-fulfilling prophecy in that it can be triggered by 
the belief that the other player will not choose to cooperate.
While only an example, the game shows why continuing trust 
in the willingness of others to cooperate is essential to the future 
of the relationship between preferential trade agreements and 
GVCs. In the past 25 years governments signed deep agree-
ments, and firms fragmented production internationally. These 
decisions reinforced each other and sustained a cooperative 
equilibrium (the upper-left corner). In the next 25 years changing 
expectations for the course of policy could lead to a reversal and 
result in an inferior equilibrium where production is progressively 
renationalized and trade agreements undone (the lower-right 
corner). This coordination failure can be avoided as long as firms’ 
expectations of future trade policy does not induce them to opt 
for national production, with policymakers offering protection 
and undoing trade agreements.
Conclusions
New World Bank data on the content of trade agreements show 
that preferential trade agreements are becoming deeper. First, 
economic theory indicates that preferential trade agreements 
and GVC integration are related, as the smooth functioning of 
cross-border production activities calls for the regulation of 
behind-the-border policy areas. Theory also points out that, in a 
GVC context, preferential trade agreements and the multilateral 
trade system generally complement each other because some 
policy areas can be more efficiently regulated within smaller 
groups of like-minded countries. But many important questions 
on the relationship between preferential trade agreements and 
GVCs remain open. One is on the content (or, equivalently, the 
efficient design) of deep preferential trade agreements; another 
is on the optimal choice of preferential trade agreement part-
ners. The literature has investigated these questions in models 
of shallow agreements and national production, but not for deep 
agreements and GVCs.
Second, thanks to the new data on the content of prefer-
ential trade agreements and on measures of GVC integration, 
some progress has been made in illuminating the extent of the 
relationship between preferential trade agreements and GVCs. 
Recent evidence shows that deep preferential trade agree-
ments boosts GVC integration and that undoing this depth is 
likely to hurt GVCs. The content of preferential trade agree-
ments also matters: WTO-extra provisions are key drivers of 
GVCs for North–South preferential trade agreements, while 
WTO-plus provisions are important for South–South GVC inte-
gration. And an analysis of China’s trade agreements indicates 
that the choice of the “right” preferential trade agreement 
partners is affected by a country’s GVC position, stressing the 
importance of comparative advantage at the task level among 
other factors.
On the future of GVCs and deep agreements, there are rea-
sons for optimism and reasons for concern. In the past 25 years 
governments signed deep preferential trade agreements and 
firms fragmented production. These decisions reinforced each 
other and sustained a cooperative equilibrium. In the next 25 
years changing expectations for the course of policy could lead 
to a reversal and result in an inferior equilibrium where pro-
duction is progressively renationalized and trade agreements 
undone. Continuing trust in the willingness of others to cooper-
ate to preserve an open system is essential to the future of the 
relationship between preferential trade agreements and GVCs.
TABLE 8.1 The trust dilemma of deep integration
Players: Home, Foreign
Global value 
chains and deep 
agreements
National 
production and no 
agreement
Global value chains and 
deep agreements 2, 2 0, 1
National production and 
no agreement 1, 0 1, 1
Source: Author’s elaboration.
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Notes
1. This chapter uses the term “preferential trade agreements” rather 
than “regional trade agreements” since some of these agreements 
are not necessarily between countries within the same region or in 
regional proximity.
2. This section draws on Hofmann, Osnago, and Ruta (2017).
3. See Freund and Ornelas (2010), WTO (2011), and Limao (2016) for 
recent surveys of the literature on preferential trade agreements.
4. This database offers the most comprehensive and up-to-date data avail-
able on the number of trade agreements, countries, and policy areas 
covered. The database is freely available on the World Bank website at 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/deep-trade-agreements.
5. See Maggi (2014), Bagwell, Bown, and Staiger (2015), Bagwell and 
Staiger (2016), and Grossman (2016) for recent reviews.
6. This section is based on Osnago, Rocha, and Ruta (2016).
7. Data on trade in parts and components come from Comtrade, while 
the data on trade in value added are based on the decomposition by 
Wang, Wei, and Zhu (2016) and come from the World Input-Output 
Database.
8. This section looked at the impact of preferential trade agreements in 
boosting GVC trade. A related question is whether the undoing of a 
preferential trade agreement would negatively affect GVCs. Mulab-
dic, Osnago, and Ruta (2017) studied the effect that EU membership 
had on GVC and overall trade of the United Kingdom, most notably 
with its European partners, and then used this information to assess 
the future of U.K.–EU trade under different scenarios.
9. This section is based on Osnago, Rocha, and Ruta (2016).
10. Maggi (2014) discusses a similar rationale. Specifically, bargaining fric-
tions may be higher for negotiations that involve many countries and 
complex issues. For this reason, deep provisions may be more effi-
ciently negotiated in a preferential trade agreement or in an agree-
ment involving a subset of members within the WTO, such as a pluri-
lateral or critical-mass agreement.
11. The preferential trade agreements are with Australia; Chile; Costa 
Rica; Hong Kong, China; Iceland; Macao, China; New Zealand; Paki-
stan; Peru; the Republic of Korea; Singapore; Switzerland; and the 
10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Brunei, Cambo-
dia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Viet Nam).
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